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LIVING WILLS
This paper examines the notion of living wills, that is recovery and resolution plans, and 
considers development in the UK and the USA as well as international initiatives (in 
particular Financial Stability Board recommendations) and some EU proposals that 
represent the seeds of forthcoming legislation in this area. Living wills effectively tackle the 
too big to fail problem, by making sure that no institution is too big, too complex or too 
interconnected to fail and have become an essential element of the international framework 
to prevent future crises.
Living wills are contingency plans that outline what a financial firm should do in the 
presence of a range of increasingly distressing scenarios. This article outlines the main 
elements of living wills, summarises how authorities globally are incorporating living wills 
into regulation and supervision and highlights further steps that need to be taken to assure 
that living wills contribute to financial stability.
Living wills have the same philosophy as other early intervention mechanisms, such as 
prompt corrective action, namely to act early so as to minimise costs to taxpayers and 
prevent “bail-outs”, as well as to help limit and counteract the externalities that generally 
accompany bank and financial failures. The information embedded in a living will provides 
a degree of certainty and predictability that addresses the information asymmetries that 
characterise the business of banking and finance and that are a source of its vulnerability. 
Living wills are a vital component of the comprehensive approach that is needed to prevent 
future crises.1 They represent what amounts to a financial continuity plan for banks. Just 
as business continuity plans outline how a bank could continue to operate in the wake of 
a natural disaster, power failure or terrorist attack, living wills outline how a bank could 
continue to operate, if it came under extreme financial stress. As such, living wills contribute 
both to better supervision and to better resolution.
From the point of view of the firm, living wills are business plans for contraction (including 
the termination of the business in extreme circumstances). From the point of view of the 
authorities, living wills constitute an effective crisis management tool, one that is suited to 
address the problems of systemically significant financial institutions. As acknowledged, 
bank and financial crisis management comprises an array of official and private responses 
which extends beyond the insolvency proceedings that are the only tool typically available 
to deal with corporate bankruptcy in other industries. In addition to lender of last resort, 
deposit insurance, special bank insolvency proceedings and a variety of ex post rescue 
packages (“bail-outs”), the emphasis has now turned to early intervention procedures, 
preventive measures (enhanced macro and micro prudential supervision and counter-
cyclical regulation) and contingency planning (stress testing and living wills) and “bail-in”.
Living wills have two parts:
1 A recovery plan which outlines the steps the bank itself could take to assure 
that it maintained adequate capital and liquidity, even if it came under extreme 
stress. This recovery plan is for the bank to develop and “own”. The supervisor 
1 Introduction
2 Living wills
1 For a general description of this comprehensive approach see Huertas (2011a). 
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assesses the plan and determines whether or not the plan provides the bank 
with sufficient resiliency. If it does not, the supervisor may take steps to 
induce the bank to improve its resiliency.
2  A resolution plan which outlines the steps the authorities would take, if the bank 
were to fail to meet threshold conditions and the supervisor determines that the 
bank should be put into resolution. The resolution plan is for the authorities to 
develop and “own”. The bank merely provides data to the authorities. The 
authorities use that data to develop a resolution plan that includes the method(s) 
they would employ to resolve the bank and how they would implement those 
methods so that resolution could proceed rapidly. 
Regulators in many countries are now requiring banks to develop living wills and submit 
them to supervisors for review. The United Kingdom has been at the forefront of policy and 
regulatory changes to advance the concept of living wills, which was first proposed in 
January 2008 in a Treasury consultation paper entitled “Financial Stability and Depositor 
Protection: Strengthening the Framework”. For some time the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) has been requesting institutions to prepare living wills. In August 2011 the FSA 
published its combined consultation and discussion paper (CP11/16) setting out detailed 
proposals for recovery and resolution planning for deposit taking institutions and certain 
major investment banks.2 With the forthcoming dismantling of the FSA (due to take place 
at the beginning of 2013), the tasks concerning living wills will be part of the remit of the 
Prudential Regulatory Authority. The Bank of England and the FSA published a document 
in May 2011, “Our approach to Banking Regulation”3 in which they emphasised that 
“resolvability” is a key element of UK prudential regulation and in particular in considering 
the appropriateness of firm structures.
On July 19, 2011 the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision released a consultative document on “Effective Resolution of Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions. Recommendations and Timelines”,4 setting out proposed 
2  http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp11_16.pdf.
3 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/speeches/boe_pra.pdf.
4 http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_110719.pdf.
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measures to address the systemic and moral hazard risks posed by systemically important 
financial institutions (SIFIs). The measures implement the framework contained in the 
FSB’s recommendations endorsed by the G20 Leaders in November 2010. The proposed 
measures comprise four key building blocks: (1) Strengthened national resolution regimes 
that give a designated resolution authority a broad range of powers and tools, including 
statutory bail-in, to resolve a financial institution that is no longer viable; (2) Cross-border 
cooperation arrangements in the form of institution-specific cooperation agreements, 
underpinned by national law, that will enable resolution authorities to act collectively to 
resolve cross-border firms in a more orderly, less costly, way; (3) Improved resolution 
planning by firms and authorities based on ex ante resolvability assessments that should 
inform the preparation of Recovery and Resolution Plans;5 and (4) Measures to remove 
obstacles to resolution arising from complex firm structures and business practices, 
fragmented information systems, intra-group transactions, reliance on service providers 
and the provision of global payment services.
These measures address problems that became apparent with the failure of Lehman 
Brothers. Efforts to resolve this firm were greatly complicated by a lack of preparation. 
Basic information was missing about organisational structures and relationships between 
subsidiaries. This made it difficult to act quickly, to anticipate the effects of different 
actions in different jurisdictions, and to resolve conflicts between subsidiaries and 
jurisdictions. Much economic value was lost as a result. When a firm falls into distress, 
the authorities and the firm need detailed contingency plans to implement rapid, well-
planned measures to ensure that the firm can continue to perform critical functions, or 
wind them down if necessary, without spill-overs that damage the wider system. An 
adequate, credible RRP should be required for any firm which is assessed by its home 
authority to have a potential impact on financial stability, in the event of liquidation of that 
firm. The SIFI Recommendations call for RRPs to be put in place for all G-SIFIs. Authorities 
and SIFIs are currently working together to create RRPs for each firm. RRPs should set 
out in advance the measures, in the event of a crisis, that a firm could take to recover as 
a going concern or else that the authorities could take to resolve it in an orderly way. 
RRPs and resolvability assessment complement each other: RRPs should use as a base 
the conclusions of the resolvability assessments discussed above; indeed, an important 
benefit of the process of developing a plan is to identify actions that firms need to take to 
make themselves resolvable. RRPs of G-SIFIs will be reviewed, subject to adequate 
confidentiality agreements, within the institution’s Crisis Management Group at least 
annually. To ensure the involvement of the key decision makers and keep them informed, 
the adequacy of RRPs of G-SIFIs should also be the subject of a formal review, at least 
on annual basis, by top officials of home and relevant host supervisory and resolution 
authorities, where appropriate, with the firm’s CEO. 
In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act 20106 has established the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (FSOC), to address macro-prudential supervision and living wills are one of the 
tools foreseen to enhance financial stability. On July 26, 2011, the FSOC released its first 
Annual Report. As directed by section 112 of Dodd-Frank, the Annual Report included a 
set of recommendations directed at both market participants and regulatory agencies. The 
recommendations included: Heightened Risk Management and Supervisory Attention, 
Reforms to Address Structural Vulnerabilities, Reform of the Housing Finance System and 
Coordinated Implementation of Financial Reform.
5 Ibid.
6 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub. L. No. 111-203, H. R. 4173).
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Amongst the heightened standards that the Federal Reserve System was required to 
promulgate (within 18 months from effective date of the Act, unless otherwise specified) the 
following are noteworthy from the point of view of this paper: resolution plans (“living will”) 
and credit exposure reporting requirements, stress test requirements, prompt corrective 
action requirements and contingent capital requirements.
On September 13, 2011, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation approved a final rule7 
on resolution plans under Section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which must still also be 
approved by the Federal Reserve, and an interim final rule8 requiring insured depository 
institutions with $50 billion or more in total assets to submit resolution plans. Generally, the 
FDIC and the Federal Reserve have agreed on an integrated single plan approach to the 
resolution plans, and the two resolution plan rules are intended to work in tandem. Included 
with this memo is a comparison chart of the different information requirements in the 
Section 165(d) and insured depository institution resolution plan rules which cuts through 
the different wording and ordering in the rules. 
Though the earliest resolution plans will be due by July 1, 2012, the FDIC and the Federal 
Reserve have adopted an approach of staggered initial submissions to allow some firms 
to submit their resolution plans later than others based on a test linked to total nonbank 
assets. Moreover, resolution plans will be built on an iterative, tailored approach. Plans will 
accordingly develop over time and in successive submissions, and plans will vary 
depending on the size and complexity of the covered company or covered insured 
depository institution. U.S. regulators have aligned the timing of resolution plan submissions 
with the timing of resolution plan submissions as suggested by the Financial Stability 
Board,9 thus putting in place a structure that will permit most foreign-headquartered 
financial institutions operating in the U.S. to work first with their home country regulators 
for an entire yearly cycle and then, after one cycle with their home country regulators, to 
submit resolution plans to the U.S. regulators.
The concept of living wills has also found favour in some recent initiatives in the EU. 
Though there is currently no EU framework for managing crises in the banking and financial 
sector, the EU Commission has published a number of documents that constitute the 
seeds of legislative reform in this area. In October 2009, the Commission issued a 
communication on an EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking 
Sector10 and invited public consultation. The communication addressed: (1) early 
intervention (i.e., actions by supervisors aimed at restoring the stability and financial 
soundness of an institution when problems appear, together with intra-group asset 
transfers between solvent entities for the purposes of financial support. These actions 
would be taken before the threshold conditions for resolution are met, and before the 
institution is or likely to become insolvent); (2) resolution (i.e., measures taken by national 
resolution authorities to manage a crisis in a banking institution, to contain its impact on 
financial stability and, where appropriate, to facilitate an orderly winding up of the whole or 
parts of the institution, such as a temporary “bridge bank”); and (3) insolvency (including 
reorganization measures and winding-up procedures). 
7  http://www.fdic.gov/news/board/Sept13no4.pdf. 
8  http://www.fdic.gov/news/board/Sept13no6.pdf.
9   Above note 4. By December 2011, the first drafts of the recovery plans should be completed.  By June 2012, 
the first drafts of the resolution plans should be completed. By December 2012, both the recovery plans and 
the resolution plans should be completed. See Davis Polk, “Credible Living Wills Under the US Regulatory 
Framework”, 19 September 2011.
10  Commission Communication on “An EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking 
Sector”, 20.10.2009, COM (2009) 561.
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In May 2010 the Commission issued a communication on Bank Resolution Funds.11 In 
October 2010, the Commission issued another Communication on an EU framework for 
Crisis Management in the Financial Sector in October 2010 for all financial institutions, 
credit institutions, investment firms, insurance companies, investment funds and Central 
Counterparties.12 No entity should be “too big too to fail.” Ailing institutions of any type 
and size, and in particular systemically important institutions, should be allowed to fail 
without risk to financial stability whilst avoiding costs to taxpayers. The crisis management 
framework comprises:
– preparatory and preventative measures such as a requirement for recovery 
and resolution plans (“living wills”) and powers for authorities to require banks 
to make changes to their structure or business organization where such 
changes are necessary to ensure that the institution can be resolved;
– powers for supervisors to take early action to remedy problems before they 
get out of hand such as the power to change the managers; and
– resolution tools which empower authorities to take the necessary action, 
where bank failure cannot be avoided, to manage that failure in an orderly way 
such as powers to transfer assets and liabilities to a bridge bank.
This communication was followed by a consultation on Technical Details of a Possible EU 
Framework for Bank Recovery and Resolution on January 6, 2011.13 A broad range of 
issues was considered, from prevention and early intervention to bank resolution measures 
and financing arrangements. This consultation set out technical details of the framework 
outlined in the Commission’s Communication of October 2010. The consultation closed on 
the 3 March 2011.14 A draft directive expected to have been published in the fall of 2011 
has been delayed given the pressing problems posed by the sovereign debt crisis in 
Greece and its contagion effects upon other sovereigns on the one hand and European 
banks on the other hand. In spring 2010 the Commission established a group of insolvency 
law experts to assist with the preparatory work. A report by the European Parliament has 
also made important recommendations on Cross-Border Crisis Management in the 
Banking Sector (the Ferreira Report). 
Under a recovery plan the bank is forced to think through in advance what it would do, if 
the bank were to fall under extreme stress. Recovery plans build on two things that banks 
should be doing in any event – capital planning and liquidity planning. Banks are already 
required to plan for how they would maintain their capital and liquidity above certain 
threshold levels even under a severe stress scenario.
What recovery plans do is ask how the bank would maintain adequate capital and adequate 
liquidity if the stress turns out to be even greater than postulated and/or the bank’s primary 
course of action under the postulated stress scenario turns out to be insufficient. In credit 
terms, the recovery plan asks the bank to tell the supervisor what is the bank’s second way 
out. This enables the supervisor to determine how resilient the bank is likely to be and, if 
3 Recovery plans
11 Commission Communication on “Bank Resolution Funds”, 26.5.2010, COM (2010) 254 Final. 
12  Commission Communication on “An EU framework for Crisis Management in the Financial Sector”, 20.10.2010, 
COM (2010) 579 Final.
13  DG Internal Market and Services Working Document “Technical Details of a Possible EU Framework for Bank 
Recovery and Resolution”, Brussels, 6.1.2011.
14  See generally http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/crisis_management/index_en.htm.
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need be, to induce the bank to take steps to improve its resiliency. The review of the bank’s 
recovery plan is therefore an integral component of a more forward looking and pro-active 
approach to supervision.
The options proposed under a recovery plan should be judged under four criteria: 
– They should be capable of execution within a reasonably short time frame, 
certainly no longer than six months and ideally within three. It is especially 
advantageous for banks to have options that can be executed within a very 
short time frame with a high degree of certainty. Options that carry a high 
degree of execution risk and/or take a long time to implement are unlikely to 
lead to a successful recovery.
– They should be sizeable, both individually and in aggregate, so that the plan has 
a reasonable chance of being able to turn the institution around. Actions have to 
have a material impact on the institution, if the institution is to achieve a turnaround.
– They should be diverse, so that the bank has a range of options to choose 
from. The actual choice will depend on the circumstances prevailing at the 
time the institution gets into trouble.
– They should be credible to key stakeholders – shareholders, debt holders, 
depositors, counterparties, central banks and supervisors. Accordingly, the 
recovery plan should address how the bank would handle communication 
with and disclosure to those stakeholders and the public at large so as to 
maintain confidence in the institution during the recovery process. 
Firms that meet these four criteria are likely to be resilient even under extreme stress. 
Those that do not will probably be vulnerable. This is the key assessment or judgment for 
the supervisor to make when reviewing the bank’s recovery plan. For banks that are not 
likely to be resilient the supervisor will want to engage in a dialogue with the bank’s 
management and board of directors as to how the bank might be made more resilient, 
and the supervisor will want to be cautious about approving business expansion plans 
(particularly acquisitions) until the bank has become resilient.
Even for banks that are resilient, a recovery plan will necessarily require the bank to 
consider in advance some tough strategic choices. To survive, the bank may be forced 
to do things that it would prefer not to do in normal times, such as issuing new equity 
capital, selling/running down certain businesses or even selling the firm itself. But it is 
certainly wise to think through in advance what could be done in extreme stress. This not 
only forces the bank’s board and management to consider that extreme stress could 
occur, but it lays out what actions the bank could take to rectify the situation. Just as one 
wants to know well in advance of the fire what the evacuation procedures are, so too 
does one want to know what the bank would do if extreme financial stress were to 
materialize.
Raising additional capital. In terms of capital, a recovery plan forces a bank to think 
through the steps that it would take to generate additional capital in a time of extreme 
stress. Although a bank in stress may be able to go to investors to raise new capital, it is 
unlikely to be able to do so successfully within the time frame required, unless it already 
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maintains an on-going and deep relationship with the prospective investors. The bank 
also has to recognise that investors are few and far between who are able and potentially 
willing to put very large amounts of capital on the line at short notice. These investors are 
likely to have the pick of possible transactions, so getting new capital for a bank in trouble 
may be especially hard, if there are other banks in slightly less troubled situations which 
are looking to raise money at the same time. Even if the bank does succeed in getting 
new capital, it is likely to be very expensive indeed and could pose significant dilution to 
existing shareholders.
Consequently, banks may wish to give greater consideration to raising contingent capital 
whilst they are still some distance from real trouble. Such capital takes the form of debt or 
preferred stock at inception, but converts to core Tier 1 capital if a certain threshold is 
passed. Provided the trigger for conversion into core Tier 1 capital assures that conversion 
will in fact take place when the bank needs new capital, contingent capital provides both 
certainty of execution (the money is already in the door) and speed.15
Raising additional liquidity. In a crisis liquidity is the lifeblood that keeps a bank alive. So 
any recovery plan has to include a robust contingent liquidity plan.
Banks are already required to develop a contingency funding plan as part of their normal 
liquidity management, and this plan is certainly the foundation for the liquidity aspects of 
the recovery plan. From the vantage point of a recovery plan, it can be assumed that the 
bank is already under extreme stress, so the questions that are likely to feature prominently 
in the liquidity aspects of the recovery plan are the following:
– To what extent does the bank have back-up sources of liquidity from the 
private market? Are these contractual and can the counterparty be relied 
upon to perform promptly?
– To what extent is the bank likely to have available the necessary collateral that 
may be required to secure additional funding from private sources? Does the 
bank have a collateral budget that shows the amount and types of collateral 
that funds providers will require? In particular, does the bank have a schedule 
of the additional collateral that it would be required to pledge to current 
market counterparties if the bank is downgraded?
– At what point does the bank envisage that it would have to access routine 
sources of central bank funding? Does the bank have in place the necessary 
legal agreements in place to borrow from the central bank(s)? Is the bank 
likely to have sufficient unencumbered eligible assets to secure such 
borrowing from the central bank(s)? Has the bank prepositioned such assets 
with the central bank and/or made arrangements to rapidly transfer/pledge 
such assets to the central bank? If the bank does obtain funding from the 
central bank, what are the prospects that the bank can repay that financing 
with a relatively short (one month) horizon?
15  The notes carry a very significant spread (several percentage points) above the bank’s senior debt. This spread 
can be thought of as an insurance premium that the bank pays to investors to have them standing ready to 
provide new equity capital at a predetermined price should the bank have to raise new equity. Effectively, 
contingent capital is financial continuity insurance. 
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Sale or run down of business. If the sale of one or more business units is to be part of a 
credible recovery plan, the bank should be able to demonstrate that the unit in question is 
readily saleable.16 This is much more likely to be the case if the business is: 
– housed in a separate subsidiary (so that the ownership of the business can be 
sold through the sale of the stock in the subsidiary to the third-party buyer);
– operationally separable from the rest of bank, so that the buyer would not 
have to rely upon the systems of the seller; and
– self-sufficient from a funding and liquidity point of view.
In addition, the concept of “readily saleable” also depends on the need to obtain shareholder 
and regulatory approval and the likely time required to obtain such approvals.
Ideally, the businesses to be sold are strong, healthy businesses. These are likely to be 
attractive to third-party buyers and more likely to sell quickly without the need for vendor 
finance. It is much more problematic to sell poorly performing businesses. The seller may 
even need to pay the buyer to take the business. There are circumstances where it may 
make sense to do just that, but such sales are not likely to boost confidence among 
market participants about the firm’s overall future.
Should a bank decide as part of its recovery plan that it needs to exit a business, it is 
important that the bank do so in a manner that boosts, rather than undermines, confidence. 
It is generally counterproductive for a bank to simply walk away from an affiliate where the 
bank has ownership and/or management control. The lack of willingness to support an 
affiliate may be deemed as a lack of ability to do so and undermine the confidence of the 
market in the group as a whole. Rather than let the subsidiary fail, the group will generally 
find it preferable to wind the subsidiary up gradually, working down the assets and reducing 
the liabilities over time whilst maintaining the subsidiary as a going concern. Absent 
nationalisation, expropriation or some other extraordinary event that differentially destroys 
a particular subsidiary, it is usually a very bad idea for a major international bank even to 
contemplate walking away from a wholly owned bank subsidiary.17 
Running down the book. In developing a recovery plan banks will want to give particular 
attention to how quickly cash can be generated from various businesses, if the bank 
shifts from normal business more toward a run-off mode. Of course, doing so will reduce 
on-going income and may require the bank to take capital losses, and this would have to 
be weighed against the benefits of more immediate increases to liquidity that could result 
16  Although the bank would not need to maintain an ongoing data room for the businesses that it would 
potentially put up for sale, it would need to assure itself and its supervisor that it could quickly assemble the 
type of data that a prospective buyer would want to review as part of due diligence prior to completing a 
purchase of the business.
17  There are certainly shades of grey that can be applied to the above statements. Banks could contemplate a 
spin- off of a business to the bank’s own shareholders (but this will generally require some assurance that the 
newly spun off entity can continue to fund itself once outside the group). For cases (such as structured 
investment vehicles [SIVs]) where the bank clearly indicated to investors that the vehicle was separate from the 
bank, it has been possible in some cases for the bank to liquidate a vehicle over which it had management 
control, provided the bank took steps to assure that any losses were imposed on investors in the vehicle in strict 
seniority. For example, some banks decided during the crisis to liquidate the SIVs that they had sponsored 
rather than take them on balance sheet. In such liquidations investors in the junior securities of the SIV took 
losses. But even in these cases, the decision to liquidate was taken after negotiation with the investors in the 
junior securities.
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from shifting toward run off mode. In an active market widening the spread that the bank 
charges on roll-overs and/or tightening standards will cause borrowers to finance or 
refinance elsewhere, reducing the book that the bank has to finance and the capital that 
the bank has to keep. Similarly, restricting trading limits and raising liquidity charges to 
the trading desk can induce trading businesses to run down the trading book, potentially 
reducing positions that have to be financed and capital that has to be posted. 
Arbitrage books may be particularly good candidates for creating capital and/or liquidity 
from a “run-off”, as they tend to be low-margin businesses with limited customer impact. 
And, if such businesses cannot be unwound under stress in a manner that does in fact 
generate capital and liquidity for the bank, it may be a sign that the business is not being 
charged a cost of capital and/or funding commensurate with the risk that such books pose 
to the bank. Indeed, if trading book positions cannot be unwound over a fairly limited time 
frame (say 60 days), one may question why they are in the trading book at all.
The state of the overall market significantly affects the likelihood that a run-off strategy can 
succeed. If a bank gets into trouble on its own, it is far more likely to be able to execute such 
a run-off successfully. A classic example is the ability of Salomon Brothers to run down its 
balance sheet by some 35% within the course of six weeks in 1991 following severe sanctions 
by the US government in response to Salomon’s attempt to corner the US government bond 
market. But even in this recent crisis major banks have succeeded in dramatically reducing 
the size of their balance sheets, largely by restricting the size of their trading books.18
Sale of the entire business. Finally, the recovery plan should give some consideration as 
to whether the entire business could be sold to a third party. Many of the issues raised 
above in connection with the sale of individual businesses will also apply to a sale of the 
whole business.
Two additional issues stand out – antitrust and completion risk. The most likely candidate 
to buy a large, complex bank at relatively short notice is another large complex bank. That 
poses potential antitrust issues, and these need to be considered in reaching an evaluation 
as to whether such a sale could be contemplated in the recovery phase, only in the 
resolution phase or not at all.
Completion risk is higher with respect to the sale of the entire firm. The closer the selling 
firm is to resolution, the more likely it is that some type of liquidity backstop and/or 
guarantee19 of the selling firm’s transactions by the buyer will be required. Such a guarantee 
may require the approval of the shareholders and/or regulators of the acquiring firm.20 If 
so, the selling firm would be placed in limbo whilst the acquiring firm sought the approval 
of the shareholders for the guarantee – hardly the most appealing prospect either to the 
shareholders of the acquiring firm or the creditors of the selling firm. So selling the entire 
firm to a third party is practically speaking only an option if the sale process starts early 
enough (so that a guarantee of the obligations of the seller is not required) and/or the time 
required for regulatory and shareholder approval is kept to a minimum.
18  For example, in the year ending 30 November 2008 Morgan Stanley reduced total assets by 37% (see 
http://www.morganstanley.com/about/ir/shareholder/10k113008/10k1108.pdf, p. 79) and Goldman Sachs by 21% 
(see http://www2.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/financials/archived/annual-reports/financial-section-
2008.pdf, p. 61). 
19  An example is the guarantee that JPMorgan Chase gave in March 2008 to facilitate its acquisition of Bear 
Stearns [see Cohan (2009), pp. 117-120].  
20  This would have been the case had Barclays offered to guarantee the obligations of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 [see Paulson (2010), pp. 202-203].
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In sum, recovery plans are as much good management as sound supervision. They highlight 
the steps that the bank would need to take to cope under extreme stress. If these steps 
would be sufficient to allow the bank to survive, the bank can be said to be resilient and 
planning can focus on how and when the steps should be implemented. If, however, the plan 
indicates that the steps are unlikely to be sufficient, planning should focus on the measures 
that will be required in order to make the bank resilient under extreme stress.
Resolution plans differ from recovery plans. Banks can create and implement their own 
recovery plans. In contrast, resolution plans are for the authorities to develop and implement. 
What living wills ask banks to do in advance is to make preparations so that the bank would 
be able to furnish at short notice the information that the authorities would need in order to 
make a choice among the resolution methods open to the authorities to use, should the 
condition of the bank deteriorate to the point where the authorities have to intervene.
In forming a resolution plan, authorities need to focus on the steps they could actually take 
under current legislation, if the bank were to fail to meet threshold conditions and be put 
into resolution. Effectively, the authorities are looking to make a preliminary assessment of 
the resolution method that they would employ, if the bank were to fail, and to figure out in 
advance the steps that they would need to take in order to be able to implement that 
method rapidly, should the bank actually fail.
In a paper published by UK law firm Slaughter and May of October 2011 (“Unfinished 
testaments: The blueprints for recovery and resolution”), Charles Randell et alii argue that 
“Resolution powers are to financial institutions what emergency powers are to citizens – 
the suspension or override of ‘normal’ rights, including the detention or disposal of 
businesses swiftly and without trial (generally, affected parties will not be able to use the 
courts to block or delay regulatory action). Resolution, thus, potentially involves significant 
regulatory or governmental interference with legal rights, whether statutory or contractual”.
If a firm is beyond recovery, it may need regulatory intervention to arrange an orderly resolution. 
There are no easy choices when it comes to intervention/resolution of bank, especially a 
large, complex bank with significant international branches and/or subsidiaries. A decision to 
inject equity and avoid resolution entirely solves the immediate problem, but it poses 
significant immediate and even more significant potential costs in that it destroys the public 
finances, undermines market discipline and sows the seeds of future crises. A decision to 
place the bank under temporary public ownership may avoid the immediate cost of an 
equity infusion, but could require the government to issue a blanket guarantee of some or 
all of the bank´s liabilities. That could adversely affect the government’s own credit rating 
and borrowing costs, unless the period of temporary public ownership were very brief 
indeed. A decision to resolve the bank through deposit transfer and/or bridge bank limits the 
scope of any government guarantee but may involve severe disruption to the credit and/or 
securities markets as a result of the bank’s becoming a gone concern. A decision to pay off 
insured deposits and liquidate the bank requires no guarantee but may require significant 
amounts of immediate funding and will pose significant operational risks. Indeed, panic 
could result, if a pay-off is attempted but fails to complete within a brief time frame.
These are choices with massive implications for the bank in question and society at large, 
and they must be made quickly. Indeed, the longest period of time that the authorities are 
likely to have to make a decision is the roughly 36 to 48 hours between the close of business 
on a Friday in Europe and North America and the opening of markets in Asia when it is still 
Sunday evening in North America. To make such decisions in that time frame the authorities 
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must have a framework for making the decision and information on which to base the 
decision. They should also think through in advance some of the issues that are likely to arise 
in connection with communicating the decision to key stakeholders and to the public at large.
Framework for decision. Conceptually, there is consensus that the choice of resolution 
method should be based on some type of cost-benefit test. For systemic institutions this 
should take into account overall costs and benefits for society as a whole, rather than 
narrow considerations of least cost to the deposit guarantee scheme. With respect to who 
makes the decision, there is also, as a practical matter, consensus that the decision with 
respect to resolution method for large, systemically important institutions is one for 
governments to make and that the decision may ultimately be made by the finance minister 
in consultation with the head of government. Supervisors and central banks may provide 
advice with respect to the decision that should be taken, but the decision is ultimately one 
for governments to take at the highest level.
Information requirements. To make this assessment the authorities require certain 
information from the bank and/or require assurance that certain information would be 
available on short notice, if the bank were to fail. By asking banks to outline such information 
and to determine in advance that they could in fact generate the details of such information 
on short notice, the authorities can reduce or possibly even eliminate the possibility that 
the intervention/resolution of a troubled bank would require the injection of taxpayer funds 
and/or the extension of government guarantees, such as was judged to be required many 
times during the crisis.
The type of information the authorities require is the same type of information that an 
insolvency practitioner would ideally like to have upon the commencement of an 
administration process for a firm. This includes the legal vehicle structure of the banking 
group, a mapping of its principal businesses against that legal vehicle structure and 
identification of financial and operational dependencies among various elements of the 
group. It also includes information concerning the bank’s membership in payments, 
clearing and settlement infrastructures, information concerning the segregation of client 
assets and the procedures by which such segregated client assets could be transferred to 
third parties. The authorities will need information concerning the bank’s deposit base: 
what is insured and what is not, as well as what is the maturity structure, terms and 
conditions of the deposits. Finally, the authorities will require information on any instruments 
that could be written down or converted into common equity at the point at which the bank 
becomes non-viable in private markets.21
This is exactly the information that the resolution plan requires the bank to be able to 
generate at short notice for the authorities. There is no need for the bank to create a real 
time data room for such information, but there is a need to be sure that the authorities 
could readily access such information, if the need arose, much the way that the bank 
needs to be sure that it can access relevant information about its facilities to assure 
business continuity in the event of some physical disruption. Accordingly, the authorities 
will want to assure that banks have the capability to generate such information in short 
order, and at some point will want to run through a “fire drill” to assure that the bank can 
in fact do so and at some point (e.g. when the institution comes under such stress that it 
has to initiate is recovery plan) the authorities will demand that the troubled bank populate 
21  Under Basel 3 non-core Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments should be subject to write down or conversion into 
common equity when the bank becomes non-viable in private markets.
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a data room with the relevant information, so that the authorities can engage in contingency 
planning in the event that intervention/resolution becomes required.
Therefore, in reviewing the bank’s resolution plan, the authorities are likely to give particular 
consideration to the bank’s overall structure. Are businesses easily separable, in that they 
are exclusively or predominantly booked in separate legal vehicles, where the sale of stock 
in the legal vehicle effectively constitutes a sale of the business? Or are the bank’s 
businesses booked across a variety of legal vehicles, so that each legal vehicle contains 
many businesses, and each business is booked in many legal vehicles?22 The former 
allows for easier and more rapid sale of separate businesses to third parties; the latter 
does not, and may imply that groups with such structures would need higher capital and/
or liquidity requirements to assure that they remain further away from the point of 
intervention/resolution.
In formulating the resolution plan the authorities will wish to give consideration to the 
possible knock-on effects that the resolution may have upon other financial institutions 
and the economy at large. Three elements deserve particular emphasis: client assets, 
infrastructures and international ramifications.
If clients lose access to their funds whilst the troubled bank is being resolved, this poses 
liquidity issues for the client and exposes the client to the risk of market losses whilst the 
client is unable to trade the instruments frozen at the firm in resolution. This could be a 
source of contagion from the failed institution to others. Regulators need to assure that 
banks properly segregate client money and that there are procedures in place whereby the 
segregated client money could be transferred to third parties at short notice if the bank 
were to fail [Financial Services Authority (2011)].
In addition to information requirements for the banks themselves, the authorities will also 
need to assure that they have to hand information from the infrastructures and deposit 
guarantee schemes of which the bank is a member. In particular, the authorities need to know 
whether the major infrastructures in which the troubled bank is a member are robust enough 
to withstand the failure of the troubled bank. If the infrastructure is not robust, the failure of the 
troubled bank to meet its obligations to the infrastructure could cause the infrastructure itself 
to collapse and transmit the failure of the troubled bank to the other members of the 
infrastructure.23 Similarly, the authorities need to know whether the deposit guarantee 
schemes in which the troubled bank is a member are in a position to pay out insured depositors 
promptly in the event that the troubled bank fails and the authorities elect to liquidate the bank 
and pay off the insured deposits. As indicated above, there is no better way to assure financial 
panic than to have the deposit guarantee scheme fail to meet its obligations.24
22  Note that this formulation is agnostic with respect to the assets that deposits finance. The key point is 
separability of the business, not the assets financed by the deposits.  Indeed, if anything there would potentially 
be an argument for saying that deposits should go to finance assets that can be readily marked to market.  That 
would facilitate due diligence of the assets that would be transferred with the deposit book.
23  Accordingly, the authorities need to continue to work with infrastructures and the banks that use such 
infrastructures in order to strengthen the resiliency of the infrastructures. Payment, clearing and settlement 
infrastructures are single points of failure in the financial system.  Provided they are robust, they serve as 
circuit breakers to limit the risk of contagion from the failure of one bank to another. If, however, they are not 
capable of withstanding the failure of at least one (and preferably two or more) of their largest counterparties, 
infrastructures would be a very powerful transmission mechanism for financial instability. Much has been 
done over the past two decades to strengthen infrastructures [CPSS-IOSCO (2011)].  This progress needs to 
continue.
24  Accordingly authorities need to continue to improve the operational and funding arrangements for deposit 
guarantee schemes so that they are able to pay out insured deposits promptly [Huertas (2011a), pp. 145-156].
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Finally, for internationally active institutions, the authorities in the home country will need to 
coordinate their planning with that host countries conduct so that a common plan can be 
developed, taking into account the status of the bank in each of the countries in which it 
operates as well as legal and regulatory requirements. This will allow the authorities to plan 
how they would communicate in crisis with each other and with the market. It would also 
potentially allow the authorities to remove or mitigate obstacles to rapid resolution – such 
as the need to approve a change in control – as well as to give consideration to weightier 
and more controversial issues, such as burden sharing. Accordingly, the Financial Stability 
Board has recommended that institution-specific cross-border stability groups develop 
resolution plans for each global systemically important financial institution by year end 2012 
[Financial Stability Board (2011)]. 
Communication issues. As with recovery plans, communication is an important aspect of 
resolution plans, before, during and after a decision is made with respect to the resolution 
of a large, systemically important banking group.
What resolution plans indicate to the market is that authorities are taking steps to assure 
that they will not be “forced” to bail out or rescue large firms, so that no firm is necessarily 
too big to fail. This can already have a salutary effect on market discipline. Indeed, Moody’s 
has already alerted investors to the fact that resolution plans “would remove the necessity 
to support banks as banks would no longer be too interconnected or complex to fail. This 
could potentially result in ratings downgrades where ratings currently incorporate a high 
degree of government support” [Croft and Jenkins (2009)].
As the point of intervention nears, communications become critical. The resolution plan 
needs to think through in advance the persons at the firm, relevant regulators and third 
parties who would be required to make the relevant decisions in connection with the 
intervention/resolution method chosen, the documentation and procedures that would 
have to be followed and the way in which decisions would be communicated to stakeholders 
(e.g. other regulators, market participants, media) who were not part of the decision 
process. Indeed, much of the impact of a resolution decision may depend on the way the 
public perceives the situation.
Overall, the formulation of a resolution plan will enable the authorities to determine whether 
a bank is “safe to fail,” i.e. whether the bank can be resolved without taxpayer support and 
without undue harm to the financial system and the economy as a whole. Ideally, the 
authorities would be able to devise a resolution method that would allow for maximum 
continuity in customer-related activities whilst assuring that capital providers remained 
exposed to loss and avoiding the need to give widespread or long lasting guarantees of the 
bank’s liabilities. This would avoid the problems that arise from abruptly unplugging a bank 
from payments, clearing and settlement infrastructures. It would also allow for deposit 
accounts to be maintained, and revolving credit arrangements to continue functioning. In 
effect, such a solution would amount to an accelerated, but solvent wind down of the bank 
through rapid sales of certain aspects of the bank’s activities to third parties and through a 
rapid reduction in certain activities. That would leave customers largely unaffected, but 
impose losses on investors/capital providers. This is much more likely to be the case if 
critical portions of the institution can be kept as going concerns for even a few days.
If the review determines that the bank is not “safe to fail,” the authorities will have to 
consider three possible courses of action:
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1.  Change the law. If a country does not have a special resolution regime, or if 
that regime does not contain all appropriate resolution methods, the authorities 
should give consideration to changing the law. Countries that do not have a 
special resolution regime should implement one, and resolution regimes 
should include a full complement of resolution methods, including bridge 
bank and bail-in [Financial Stability Board (2011)]. Consideration may also be 
given to requiring banks to have a minimum amount of “back-up” or contingent 
capital outstanding, so that such capital could be written down or converted 
into common equity in the event that the bank fails to meet threshold 
conditions [Huertas (2011a), pp. 204-205; Huertas (2011b)].
2. Change the firm. If a firm is not resolvable in its current form, consideration 
should be given to requiring the firm to make changes to its structure and/or 
business practices (e.g. with respect to inter-affiliate transactions and cross-
guarantees) so that the firm would become resolvable. However, such 
demands for change at the firm level are not a substitute for changing the law. 
3. Charge the firm. If a firm remains unresolvable, consideration should be given 
to imposing further requirements on the firm to reduce the probability that the 
firm will fail [Huertas (2011a), p. 203].
It is interesting to observe that the Vickers Report (the report of the Independent Commission 
on Banking25) published on 19 September 2011 suggests changes to the law and changes to 
the firm in its recommendations. The most controversial and talked about part of the Vickers 
Report is the proposed structural separation between domestic retail services and global 
wholesale and investment banking operations. This separation has been referred to by some 
as the need to separate “casino banking” from “utility banking”. Since a return to Glass-
Steagall type of legislation with a clear legal divide between investment banks and commercial 
banks appears impractical (the business of banking and finance has substantially changed 
over the last decades and today wholesale funding is often more important than retail funding, 
certainly for banks in Europe), how should the line be drawn between retail banking and 
wholesale/investment banking? Narrow banking and mutual fund banking are two different 
ways of tackling this quandary, as is – in a more limited fashion – the Volcker Rule embedded 
in the Dodd-Frank Act 2010 in the USA. According to the Vickers report, the best policy 
approach is to require retail ring-fencing of UK banks. The report argues that this type of 
structural separation should make it easier and less costly to resolve banks that get into 
trouble, should help insulate retail banking from external financial shocks, thus diminishing 
problems arising from global interconnectedness, and should increase the resilience of the 
UK retail banking system. The report has been embraced by the Government and can thus 
be considered as a blueprint for legislative reform in this area. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties inherent in keeping the information to be included in a living will 
relevant and up to date and the tension between confidentiality and disclosure, living wills form 
an important part of the overall programme to strengthen the financial system and prevent 
future crises. They are part and parcel of better supervision and they will lead to better resolution. 
5 Conclusion
25  The Independent Commission on Banking was established by the Government in June 2010 to consider 
structural and related non-structural reforms to the UK banking sector to promote financial stability and 
competition. The Commission was asked to report to the Cabinet Committee on Banking Reform by the end of 
September 2011. Its members, Sir John Vickers (Chair), Clare Spottiswoode, Martin Taylor, Bill Winters and 
Martin Wolf, published an Interim Report in April 2011 and the final report in September 2011. See Lastra, 
“Vickers is home, but not yet dry”, Parliamentary Brief, 7 October 2011. See http://www.parliamentarybrief.
com/2011/10/vickers-is-home-but-not-yet-dry.
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Recovery plans are well within the scope of banks to design and implement. Indeed, banks 
should have recovery plans as part of sound risk management. Supervision needs to 
assure that banks have such plans in place and that banks will in fact become resilient, 
even to extreme stress.
Resolution plans are more difficult. But they are an important form of contingency planning. 
They are the equivalent of civil defence for the financial system. This planning needs to be 
done, and banks should be in the position to provide the necessary information to permit 
the authorities to analyse the options for resolution, should resolution be required. Only 
through such planning can the authorities identify the steps that they will need to take and 
put themselves in a position to be able to take such steps if the need arises. 
At the Cannes Summit on 4 November 2011 the G-20 heads of state confirmed the 
conclusions of the Financial Stability Board regarding living wills.  These require global 
SIFIs to develop living wills according to the framework outlined in this article.  In addition, 
authorities are required to assess the resolvability of each global SIFI on a periodic basis. 
If a global SIFI is not resolvable (i.e. the resolution of the firm would either cause undue 
economic disruption or pose losses to taxpayers), the FSB recommends that authorities 
take steps as outlined above (‘change the law’ and/or ‘change the firm’) to make the global 
SIFI resolvable (‘safe to fail’).  For further details see Financial Stability Board, “Key 
Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions,” October 2011 
(available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104cc.pdf).
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